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Abstract We present a rational model of consumer choice, which can also
serve as a behavioral model. The central construct is λ, the marginal utility of
money, derived from the consumer’s rest-of-life problem. It provides a simple
criterion for choosing a consumption bundle in a separable consumption prob-
lem. We derive a robust approximation of λ, and show how to incorporate
liquidity constraints, indivisibilities, and adaptation to a changing environ-
ment. We find connections with numerous historical and recent constructs,
both behavioral and neoclassical, and draw contrasts with standard partial
equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more
intuitive description of consumer choice.
Keywords separable decisions · distributed choice · moneysworth demand ·
value for money
1 Introduction
John has just realized that it is his wedding anniversary. He enters the only
liquor store in town and looks for champagne. There is only one bottle, which
costs $100. How does he decide whether to buy it?
In this paper we argue that a consumer like John should recall his utility
value for money, call it λ, and use it to estimate the opportunity cost of
spending $100. He should purchase the champagne if and only if the utility it
brings covers that opportunity cost.
D. Friedman
Economics Department, University of California at Santa Cruz
J. Sa´kovics (corresponding author)
School of Economics, The University of Edinburgh,
30 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JT U.K.
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Our recommendation might sound like common sense, but it differs sharply
from what economics textbooks propose. General equilibrium theory would
require John to consider the impact on all possible future consumption plans.
As is widely recognized, for actual people, or even Homo Economicus facing
moderate computation costs or other frictions, this is too complex a problem
to solve.
Consequently, micro textbooks (and recent behavioral models of mental
accounting) propose an alternative, partial equilibrium solution: John should
have a pre-established budget to spend on items including last minute an-
niversary presents, and should purchase the champagne if and only if that
budget exceeds $100 and, on the margin, the other claims on the budget are
less pressing. We shall argue that this alternative solution, although tractable,
is twice hobbled. First, it is silent on how to specify the budget set. When and
how should John come up with the amount to spend and the range of goods
to consider? Second, the budget constraint rules out substitution of purchas-
ing power between present and future, thus preventing John from properly
responding to prices that turn out to be higher or lower than expected.
We propose to use λ, the marginal utility of money, rather than a bud-
get constraint, to link the present problem to the rest-of-life problem. The
numerical value of λ captures the trade-off between current and rest-of-life
expenditure, and thus allows the consumer to make optimal saving/borrowing
decisions. This approach resonates with the findings of consumer research,
and λ itself is a meaningful concept that can be approximated, learned and
adjusted in intuitive ways.
Our approach relates to several strands of consumer choice theory, some
historical and some more recent. These include inter alia Marshall’s theory
of demand; partial equilibrium analysis; the use of cardinal and quasi-linear
utility functions; Frisch demand functions and recursive life-cycle models.
A distinctive aspect of our approach is how it connects present and future
choices. Our consumer occasionally adjusts her estimated marginal utility of
money looking forward, but when faced with a specific consumption choice she
just uses the current value of λ. Existing approaches either ignore the future
entirely (partial equilibrium) or else refuse to consider the future as qualita-
tively distinct from the present (general equilibrium). The simple connection
we impose naturally leads to a better understanding of where λ comes from
and what makes it useful.
Our free standing theory of consumer choice includes the following innova-
tions:
– Neo-classical foundations for (cardinal) quasi-linear utility and for the use
of λ as a rule of thumb.
– Proof of near-optimality of a λ-based response to price surprises.
– Extensions to choice among baskets of indivisible goods, and choice given
liquidity constraints.
– An adaptive learning model for λ, complementing the forward looking anal-
ysis.
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– Examples showing how λ can embody behavioral biases.
Section 2 begins the exposition with a review of the lifetime consumption
problem and its textbook solution. We then define separable subproblems,
and use the indirect utility function to obtain a quasi-recursive solution to the
subproblem and its continuation problem. The first-order condition defines λ
as the opportunity cost of subproblem expenditure.
Section 3 analyzes the subproblem solution given an exogenous value of λ.
It shows that the consumer moves out along the subproblem’s Income Expan-
sion Path – the locus of points where the ratio of marginal utility to price is the
same for each good – until that ratio equals λ. The solution yields the “mon-
eysworth” demand function, whose price effects and λ effects are shown to be
quite natural. In particular, demand is always decreasing in own price (hence
there are no Giffen goods), while the cross price effects straightforwardly reflect
preference-based substitutability or complementarity. Quasilinear preferences
emerge as a natural special case.
Section 4 discusses how the consumer can calibrate λ. A Taylor expansion
of indirect continuation utility reveals that λ is approximately constant when
subproblem expenditures are small relative to lifetime income. An implication
is that λ is reusable: the consumer typically need not adjust it between con-
secutive small purchases. Eventually, however, she does need to update. We
posit two complementary methods: one is forward looking and uses relevant
news in a life-cycle setting, while the other is experiential and uses previously
observed prices to update λ.
Section 5 recalls the textbook partial equilibrium approach, which holds
the subproblem budget constant, and yields the Marshallian demand func-
tion. Proposition 3 shows that the “true” lifetime optimal demand elasticities
are typically well approximated by those of the moneysworth demand func-
tion, but only under quite special conditions are they close to the Marshallian
elasticities.
Section 6 extends the model to include liquidity constraints, which are
shown to correspond to the situation where λ is a step function of available
liquidity. Marshallian demand reappears as an extreme case, where λ = 0
below the budget and λ = ∞ over the budget. We also show that consumers
can handle indivisibilities by comparing λ to an appropriately defined quality-
price ratio.
Section 7 reiterates that, compared to textbook approaches, the λ (or mon-
eysworth) approach offers (a) more robust prescriptions for how consumers
should react to surprises, (b) a better way to connect partial equilibrium to
general equilibrium analysis, and also (c) more plausible descriptions of actual
human behavior. That section also notes fruitful avenues for future research.
Appendix A concisely reviews connections to the most relevant strands of
historical and recent economic literature, and Appendix B collects mathemat-
ical details.
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2 Preliminaries
A consumer’s lifetime consumption plan X = {(x1, ..., xN ) : xi ≥ 0} specifies
the quantities of all goods and services consumed at present and at all future
dates in all contingencies. The dimension N of the problem is astronomically
large, given even moderate numbers of goods, dates and contingencies at each
date.1 We assume that the consumer has cardinal preferences over consump-
tion, represented by the utility function U˜ : <N+ → <, which also accounts for
time preferences and random termination. She takes the (expected) price vec-
tor P = (p1, ..., pN ) as given. Initially, we assume that the normalized lifetime
purchasing power L > 0 is freely transferable across purchases.2
Absent other constraints, the consumer’s problem can be written just as
in textbooks,
max
X≥0
U˜(X) s.t. P ·X =
N∑
i=1
pixi ≤ L. (1)
The Lagrangian is
max
(X,µ)≥0
[
U˜(X) + µ(L−P ·X)
]
. (2)
Writing U˜i for the i
th partial derivative (or marginal utility), we have the
first-order conditions
U˜i(X
∗) = µpi, i = 1, ..., N
L = P ·X∗. (3)
We have nothing novel to say about multiple, corner or non-differentiable so-
lutions, so to streamline the exposition we henceforth assume that (3) has a
unique smooth solution X∗(P, L) that solves the original problem (1). Suffi-
cient conditions (e.g., that U˜ is smooth, monotone, Inada and concave) are
well known (e.g., Bewley, 2007).
Our main concern is a situation where the consumer is not solving her full
lifetime problem, just a small part of it. A consumer subproblem is to choose
an n-subvector of the lifetime consumption plan X, where 1 ≤ n << N. By
suitably reindexing, we can write X = (x, χ), where x = (x1, ..., xn) is the
subvector and χ = (xn+1, xn+2, ..., xN ) is the rest of life (or continuation)
plan. The price subvector of P for the subproblem is p = (p1, ..., pn). The idea
is to gain tractability by reducing the dimensionality from N ≈ 10100 in a
realistic lifetime problem to something small, perhaps n = 2 or 3.
That reduction is possible if the subproblem is separable, that is, if there
are subutility functions u : <n+ → < and U : <N−n+ → < such that for every
consumption plan X = (x, χ) we can, with negligible error, write
U˜(X) = u(x) + U(χ). (4)
1 Indeed, N could even be infinite and not affect our analysis.
2 Prices that apply to future goods are discounted appropriately. For simplicity, we treat
L as a constant, but later note how it can be endogenized.
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A sufficient condition for separability is that the cross second partial derivative
U˜ij(X) is zero everywhere for all i = 1, ..., n and j = n+1, ..., N . For example,
even in the same shopping episode the consumer can choose wine and cheese in
one subproblem, and choose cereals and milk in a second. Separability seems
quite plausible for both subproblems.
Given P, the consumer’s lifetime indirect utility function is
V˜ (L) = max
X∈<N
+
U˜(X) s.t. P ·X ≤ L. (5)
By construction, V˜ (.) is homogeneous of degree zero in (L,P ) and increasing
in L. Given strong classic assumptions of the sort mentioned earlier, we can
also assume that it is smooth and concave, i.e., V˜ ′(.) > 0 and V˜ ′′(.) ≤ 0 in the
relevant range (c.f. Varian 1992, pp.102ff.).
Let V (.) be the indirect utility function for the continuation plan, obtained
by imposing the additional restriction x = 0 in equation (5). Then (4) gives
us a helpful expression for indirect utility:
V˜ (L) = max
x∈<n
+
[u(x) + V (L− p · x)] , (6)
The equation says that if the subproblem is separable, then the only effect
that the choice of x has on rest-of-life utility is pecuniary – the subproblem
expenditure p · x = ∑ni=1 pixi reduces the consumer’s rest-of-life purchasing
power.3
3 Moneysworth demand
The first-order conditions for (6), which characterize the principal subvector x∗
of the solution X∗ to the lifetime problem, yield ui(x∗) = piV ′(L−p ·x∗), i =
1, ..., n. Slight reformatting yields
ui(x
∗) = λpi, i = 1, ..., n
λ = V ′(L− p · x∗), (7)
where λ = V ′(L − p · x∗) is the consumer’s marginal utility of money. We
see that λ is a sufficient statistic for the continuation problem, and that it
tells us how much utility the consumer could gain elsewhere if she cut back
subproblem expenditure by a dollar. Otherwise put, λ is the opportunity cost
of subproblem expenditure, or the “shadow utility” of purchasing power, or
the “conversion rate” between utility and money.
The first line in (7) also has a nice interpretation. It says that the marginal
utility vector (or gradient)∇u is proportional to the price vector p. Varying the
3 In the special case that the same separable subproblem recurs every period, (6) closely
resembles the Bellman equation familiar to macroeconomists (where time discounting is
built into V (.)). Note however, that in general, V˜ differs from V not only in the value of the
state variable (remaining wealth) but also in the set of (dated) goods available to purchase.
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conversion rate, λ, sweeps out the locus of points satisfying the proportionality
condition, a smooth one-dimensional curve often called the Income Expansion
Path. The IEP emanates from the origin (where the marginal utilities are
maximal) and extends into the interior of the subproblem consumption set
<n+. The marginal utility of each good decreases smoothly (and each by the
same percentage) as we move out along the IEP defined by the price vector
p. To find the demand vector satisfying both lines of (7) we simply move out
along the IEP until the common proportionality factor falls to the specified
value λ.4 At that point, (7) holds and the marginal utility of expenditure
in the subproblem matches the marginal utility of money λ specified for the
rest-of-life.
Compared to equation (3), we see that (7) offers two simplifications: it
reduces the apparent dimensionality from N + 1 to n+ 1, and it replaces the
budget equation in L by a statement of how λ, the marginal utility of money,
is determined.
The complexity of the original problem has not yet disappeared: it has just
been concentrated into the endogenous dependence of λ = V ′ on subproblem
expenditure y = p · x. The crucial next step is to show that this dependence
is tractable and indeed is often negligible.
3.1 Constant λ
We begin by analyzing demand when λ can be regarded as exogenous. In par-
ticular, suppose that the curvature of the indirect utility function is negligible
over a range of subproblem expenditure y = p · x ∈ [0, y¯]. Then the marginal
utility of money is essentially constant at λ̂ = V ′(L), so V is given by its first
order Taylor expansion
V (L− y) = V (L)− yλ̂. (8)
The consumer choice problem now becomes quite simple. Substituting (8)
into the lifetime optimization problem (6) with y = p · x and dropping the
4 Of course, expenditure L−p ·x available for the continuation problem falls as we move
out along the IEP so, by concavity, V ′ increases. Thus a more complete informal description
is that the falling proportionality factor meets the rising V ′ at a unique point x∗ on the
IEP; more formally, under present assumptions, the intermediate value theorem and implicit
function theorem guarantee a unique smooth interior solution described by (7).
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irrelevant constant term V (L) yields the unconstrained optimization problem5
max
x≥0
[
u(x)− λ̂p · x
]
. (9)
Streamline notation by dropping the decoration on the now-exogenous pa-
rameter λ̂ and take the first-order conditions for (9) to get
ui(x
λ) = λpi, i = 1, ..., n. (10)
We will refer to xλ(p) = (xλ1 (p), ..., x
λ
n(p)), the solution of (10), as the mon-
eysworth demand function.6
3.2 Income and price effects
What are the comparative statics of xλ? A change in subproblem relative
prices will shift the IEP, causing both own-price and cross price effects. On
the other hand, a move along the original IEP will arise from a change in the
subproblem price level, a change in lifetime income L, or anything else that
changes λ. In this subsection we analyze both sorts of comparative statics.
Shifts in the IEP are naturally described by second derivatives of the utility
function. Let H = ((uij)) denote the n × n Hessian matrix of second partial
derivatives of subproblem utility u(x), and let Hij denote the (n−1)× (n−1)
submatrix with ith row and jth column deleted. Vertical bars, e.g., |H|, denote
the determinant.
Proposition 1 Given a separable subproblem of dimension n ≥ 2 with price
vector p̂ ∈ <n++ and constant λ > 0, let xλ(·) >> 0, be the moneysworth
demand function that uniquely solves equation (10). Then its price sensitivities
are
∂xλj
∂pi
(p̂) =
(−1)i+jλ |Hij |
|H| , for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}. (11)
A proof appears in Appendix B (as part of the proof of Proposition 3); for
related results see also Biswas (1977) and Browning et al. (1985). Note that
for the special case of a single good in the subproblem (n = 1) we have
∂xλ
∂p
(p̂) =
λ
u′(xλ)
. (12)
5 The maximand in (9) slightly generalizes quasi-linear utility. Textbook treatments (e.g.,
Varian 1992, p. 154, 164-7) often assume that n = 1 so the variable of interest x is scalar,
and that λ̂ = 1. In our notation, the textbook quasi-linear utility function would be written
as u(x) +m with budget constraint m = L− px. Our approach shows that textbook quasi-
linear preferences can be justified for single separable goods, and can be generalized directly
for separable bundles of related goods. Given a constant exogenous λ, there is no loss of
generality in using a VNM utility function for u (and implicitly, U) that normalizes its value
to 1, but our analysis sheds light on the conditions for which the constancy assumption is
justified.
6 For given constant λ, the Frisch demand function is formally equivalent to xλ, notwith-
standing important differences in interpretation (see Section A.2).
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Properties of moneysworth demand can be gleaned from the formula (11).
The i, j symmetry of the formula (and of the matrix H) imply that the price-i
sensitivity of good j is the same as the price-j sensitivity of good i. Since H
is negative definite, the determinants |Hii| and |H| have opposite signs, so the
formula tells us that
∂xλi
∂pi
< 0, i.e., the own price effect is always negative.
Moneysworth demand therefore rules out Giffen goods.7
The cross-price effect is transparent when there are only two goods in
the subproblem, since in that case the formula collapses to
∂xλ1
∂p2
=
∂xλ2
∂p1
=
−λu21
u11u22−u12u21 . The denominator is positive by concavity, and so the cross price
effect simply is a (sign-reversing) rescaling of the cross partial derivative of
u at the consumption point. If the goods are substitutes then u21 < 0 and
demand for a good will increase when the other good’s price rises, but if they
are complements then u21 > 0 and the same price rise will decrease demand.
Thus, relative price effects for moneysworth demand arise naturally from the
second partial derivatives of u, and are easy to interpret and explain.
It is straightforward to see that a ceteris paribus shift in λ can arise from
a shift in real lifetime income after subproblem expenditure, or from a change
in cardinal preferences, but not from merely rescaling utility nor rescaling
(L,P ). The impact of a ceteris paribus shift can be expressed in terms of
Hj(p), the Hessian matrix with its jth column replaced by the price vector p.
Differentiating (10) and applying Cramer’s Rule we have immediately that
Proposition 2 The sensitivity of moneysworth demand to the marginal utility
of money is
∂xλj
∂λ
=
∣∣Hj(p)∣∣
|H| , for j = 1, ..., n. (13)
Biswas (1977) includes the equivalent expression dx/dλ = H−1 · p. In the
one-good case (13) simplifies to ∂x
λ
∂λ =
p
u′′(xλ) < 0, capturing the intuitive
notion that demand falls when the (shadow) value of money increases. In the
two-good case (13) simplifies to
∂xλj
∂λ =
pjuii−piuji
|H| =
ujuii−uiuji
λ|H| . Thus an
increase in the marginal utility of money can be decomposed into two effects.
The first one
ujuii
λ|H| is always negative, since (as noted above) the denominator
is positive and the numerator factor uii is negative by concavity. The second
term −uiujiλ|H| is positive if (and only if) the goods are substitutes, and it can
outweigh the first term. In this last case, the IEP bends backward and a higher
λ will lead to a higher consumption of good j.
7 This is intuitive, as a constant λ means that there are no income effects. As an empirical
matter, it is not clear that Giffen goods exist at all (c.f. Dwyer and Lindsay 1984; Nachbar
1998), with the possible exception of extreme poverty (c.f. Jensen and Miller 2008) when
indeed we would not expect consumers to take the future into account and to exhaust
whatever purchasing power they have.
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4 Calibrating λ
Moneysworth demand is relevant when the consumer can both (a) treat λ =
V ′(L−y) as a constant independent of subproblem expenditure y = p ·x, and
(b) obtain a good estimate of that value of λ. Let us deal with each condition
in turn.
Constancy is guaranteed when rest-of-life utility is a constant returns to
scale CES function, U˜(X) = [
∑N
i=1 aix
r
i ]
1/r for 0 6= r < 1, where ai > 0.
In that case, λ is essentially a price index for rest of life consumption and is
independent of L and y; see e.g., Varian (1992, p. 112). The same is true, of
course, for Cobb-Douglas utility, which is the r = 0 member of the CES family.
More generally, indirect utility is concave, and we need to quantify the rate
at which marginal utility declines. The exact Taylor expansion yields
V ′(L− y) = V ′(L)− yV ′′(L− αy), for some α ∈ [0, 1]. (14)
Thus the endogenous marginal utility of money is seen to consist of its zero-
expenditure value λ̂ = V ′(L) – a constant exogenous to the subproblem –
corrected by a term that is proportional to the unnormalized curvature V ′′ =
β ≤ 0 of the indirect utility function, so the decline in λ is approximately
linear in subproblem expenditure y = p · x.8
How good is that linear approximation? The long-time consensus from
work on risk aversion (reinforced by recent contributions such as Rabin, 2000)
is that the concavity of the indirect utility function should be diminishing: we
would expect that the marginal utility for money diminishes more between a
wealth of $100,000 and $200,000 than between $1,100,000 and $1,200,000. For
us, then, the worst plausible case is that β is constant. In that case, the exact
Taylor expansion V ′(L) = V ′(0)+Lβ implies β = V
′(L)−V ′(0)
L . Hence the error
term in (14) is proportional to yL , the size of the expenditure today relative
to lifetime income. Even in this worst plausible case, then, the constant λ
approximation is good for small subproblems.
A numerical example may help crystalize ideas. Let V (L) = c lnL as in
Bernoulli’s classic example, let lifetime income be L = $1 million (e.g., 50k/yr
increasing over 20 years at the discount rate), and let subproblem expenditure
be y = $100 as for John’s champagne. Pick the convenient utility scaling
c = 106 so that John’s zero-expenditure marginal utility of money is λ̂ =
V ′(106) = c10−6 = 1. Equation (14) tells us that John’s marginal utility of
money if he spends the $100 is V ′(106 − 100) = λ̂− 100β = 1 + z, where the
correction z > 0 is between −100β̂ = 102c[106]−2 = 102+6−12 = 1.00000×10−4
(where α = 0), and −100β|α=1 = 102c[106 − 100]−2 < 1.00021× 10−4. Notice
that John’s λ is hardly affected by a purchase in this range – it rises by about
one-hundredth of 1% – and that this tiny correction z is well approximated
using β̂ = V ′′(L).
A general result follows easily from the last Proposition:
8 Only approximately linear because β is a second derivative evaluated at a point that
can depend on y.
10 Daniel Friedman, Jo´zsef Sa´kovics
Corollary 1 The sensitivity of moneysworth demand to lifetime income is
given by
dxλj
dL
= −β̂
∣∣Hj(p)∣∣
|H| , j = 1, ..., n, (15)
where β̂ = V ′′(L) ≤ 0.
Proof. Differentiate (14) and evaluate at y = 0 to obtain dλdL = β̂. The
chain rule tells us that
dxλj
dL =
∂xλj
∂λ · dλdL , so (15) follows from Proposition 2.
QED.
Given that λ̂ is a good approximation, the remaining question (b) is whether,
as a practical matter, it can be estimated reasonably well. The definition of
indirect utility is not encouraging, since it refers to the entire lifetime max-
imization problem. But we only need to estimate the slope of that function,
and just for the continuation problem. Of course, at first blush the continu-
ation problem seems almost as complex as the entire problem, but there is a
qualitative sense in which it simplifies greatly when we split off the present
subproblem. The present is always idiosyncratic, if only because we have ob-
served prices to go on. The future is more nebulous, with enormous amounts
of uncertainty, and consumers may prefer to think of prices for broad cate-
gories rather than for individual items of future consumption. In other words,
while the present subproblem needs to be modeled in fine detail, we can afford
to treat the continuation in a more abstract way when estimating λ.9 We do
not propose a specific model for the continuation, but note that a reasonable
forward-looking estimate may be obtained using the stationarity assumptions
and aggregation routinely imposed in life-cycle models discussed in Section
A.2 below, or using a rule of thumb in the spirit of Love (2013).
It bears emphasizing that, once the consumer has a good estimate of her
λ, she can reuse it many times. Unlike a budget constraint, λ changes only
slightly from one small subproblem to the next, and doesn’t require frequent
recalculation. However, eventually λ will require updating, especially as the
consumer learns more about herself and her possibly changing circumstances.
Some changes in the consumer’s view of the future, such as new pension
plan, can be dealt with using the Corollary above or minor extensions. Other
changes, for example encountering a new product for the first time, concern
the current subproblem, but have ramifications for the future – and there-
fore λ. The consumer should be able to adapt λ as she observes prices over
numerous subproblems.
We therefore propose a two step process for updating λ in light of accumu-
lated experience. The first step is to translate a price observation into news
about the value of λ, and the second is to determine the magnitude of the
update.
9 The logic is reminiscent of quasi-hyperbolic discounting: there is a big difference between
today and tomorrow, but tomorrow and the day after look similar from the vantage point
of today.
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Translation is straightforward for indivisible goods. As explained in Section
6.2 below, the quality-price ratio u(b
k)
p·bk represents a new observation of λ. For
divisible goods, that procedure would never get a new observation, since x
is chosen to satisfy u1(x)p1 = λ. Instead, the consumer evaluates the marginal
quality-price ratio at the quantity xold chosen “last time.” That is, the new
observation of λ is u1(x
old)
pnew1
.
The second step weights each new observation according to its share in
overall consumption, as in simple price indices.10 Periodically – say, monthly
– the consumer collects the new observations, say {λi : i = 1, ...,m}, and
computes the share qi ∈ [0, 1] of expenditure devoted to good i in the past.
The updated value of λ is
λ
′
=
(
1−
m∑
i=1
αiqi
)
λ+
m∑
i=1
αiqiλi. (16)
Here αi ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter measuring how much the consumer weighs
new information relative to old. It also captures the consumer’s perception of
the permanence of any price changes. Thus a one-off “fire sale” should carry
little weight (very low αi) while a price hike due to a permanent new specific
tax levied on a product should have an αi close to one. Also, we would expect
all αi’s to be larger for an individual whose marginal utility diminishes more
quickly.
Note that the updating rule also implies that observations of prices of goods
that the consumer does not usually purchase (low qi) have minimal impact on
λ. Similarly, if a good gets priced out of a consumer’s reach, she will stop
buying it, so qi will decline and eventually it will have also have minimal
impact on λ.
In summary, we think of our consumer as walking around with a constant
λ, periodically updating it based on observed prices and occasionally (yearly
or when major news arrives) making a forward looking estimate (possibly with
the help of a tax accountant).
5 Comparisons
Undergraduate textbooks suggest a rather different tractable subproblem de-
mand function. For an arbitrary budget B > 0, write
max
x≥0
u(x) s.t. p · x = B. (17)
with first order conditions
ui(x
B) = νpi, i = 1, ..., n
B = p · xB . (18)
10 Here we assume, for simplicity, that the consumer does not try to extrapolate from
individual observed prices to changes in the price level. See Deaton (1977) for an exploration
of that idea.
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Let the solution (assumed unique and smooth) be xB(p) = (xB1 (p), ..., x
B
n (p)).
We shall refer to xB as the constant-budget demand function for the subprob-
lem.11
Observe that (10) differs from (18) only in two respects: it omits the budget
constraint, and λ replaces ν. Recall that ν is the marginal consumption utility
of a dollar spent over the budget. If B is not chosen optimally (as the optimal
subproblem expenditure in the lifetime problem (6)) then ν differs from the
true marginal cost of overspending.
Applying a set of fixed budgets to a set of separable subproblems will
typically generate a set of different shadow prices ν of expenditure. A standard
argument shows that this is inefficient, and the consumer will increase utility
by reallocating expenditure from low ν subproblems to those with high ν. In
contrast, a consumer who takes the trouble to optimize once can use the same
λ over and over without incurring significant efficiency losses.
The case u21 = 0 of separable goods is particularly instructive. Constant-
budget demand asserts that such goods are (gross) substitutes, due to the
pecuniary externality incorporated into in the income effect. As noted earlier,
moneysworth demand has no cross-price effect here, and directly reflects the
“want independence” between the goods; the pecuniary externality is fully
internalized in λ.
Another difference spotlights unanswered questions about the source of the
budget constraint. Relaxing the Inada condition, one still usually gets interior
solutions given a constant budget, while moneysworth demand can often be
zero. Consider, for example, u(x) = ln(x + 1), p = 1 and λ ≡ 1. The “bang
for buck” that the consumer can get is less than the opportunity cost for
any value of x. The textbook consumer would simply spend her budget. For
example, if faced with the choice of how much Beluga caviar to buy, an average
moneysworth consumer would pass, while a textbook consumer with $10 in his
pocket would by a gram. The counter argument that the consumer would not
consider the $10 as her budget for the caviar raises the followup question: and
how did she arrive at that decision? Every textbook we know is silent here.
We are now ready to ask a crucial question. How good are the two approx-
imations xλ(·) and xB(·) of the exact subproblem solution x∗(P̂)? Recall that
the latter expression solves the consumer’s lifetime plan
max
x≥0
u(x) + V (L− p̂ · x) (19)
given anticipated prices P̂ (including subvector p̂) and lifetime income L. To
make a fair comparison, suppose that B and λ are both chosen optimally, so
B = p̂ · x∗ and λ = V ′(L−B). We’ve set things up so that all three solutions
coincide when subproblem prices are exactly as anticipated, but otherwise, of
course, the solutions generally diverge. The question then becomes: how do
11 Textbooks often refer to xB as the Marshallian demand function, in distinction to the
Hicksian demand function which holds constant the utility level rather than B or λ. The
literature survey in Section A.1 will note that xB actually owes more to Hicks than to
Marshall, whose preferred demand function was a special case of xλ.
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the subproblem price sensitivities of the approximations xλ and xB compare
to that of the exact solution x∗?
The next Proposition provides a precise answer, using the Hessian notation
introduced earlier.
Proposition 3 Given a separable subproblem of dimension n ≥ 2 and a price
vector P̂ with subproblem price vector p̂, let the exact and approximate demand
functions x∗(·),xλ(·) and xB(·) be defined as in previous paragraphs. Then
there exist a vector a(p̂, H) ∈ <n and a constant b(p̂, H) ∈ <, such that for
all i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, the price sensitivities are
∂x∗j
∂pi
(p̂) =
(−1)i+j(−p̂i)n−2λ |Hij | − ajV ′′(L−B)
(−p̂i)n−2 |H| − bV ′′(L−B) , (20)
∂xλj
∂pi
(p̂) =
(−1)i+jλ |Hij |
|H| , and (21)
∂xBj
∂pi
(p̂) =
aj
b
. (22)
Appendix B contains a proof of Proposition 3, including formulae for
a(p̂, H) and b(p̂, H).12 Of course, equation (21) simply recapitulates Proposi-
tion 1.
Comparing the first and third equations in Proposition 3, one can see that
xB(·) is a reliable approximation of the exact demand function x∗(·) only if
V ′′(L−B) dominates the other factors. That is, the approximation is reliable
only if we can accurately determine the appropriate budget B = p̂ ·x∗ and we
also know that the indirect utility function is tightly curved at just the right
point.
By contrast, no fine-tuning is needed for the constant-λ approximation.
When −V ′′(L − B) is small, i.e., the indirect utility function is nearly lin-
ear around the optimal expenditure, then the price sensitivity of xλ is very
close to its true lifetime-optimal value given in the first equation. Indeed (see
Appendix B for a proof), the quality of this approximation increases mono-
tonically as curvature decreases, and the approximation becomes exact in the
“risk-neutral” (locally linear) case:
Corollary 2
∣∣∣∣∂x∗j∂pi (p̂)− ∂xλj∂pi (p̂)
∣∣∣∣ ↓ 0 as |V ′′(L−B)| ↓ 0, for each j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
12 For the single good case we have the following simplified expressions
∂x∗
∂p
(p̂) =
λ−BV ′′(L−B)
u′′(x∗)− p2V ′′(L−B) ,
∂xλ
∂p
(p̂) =
λ
u′′(x∗)
, and
∂xB
∂p
(p̂) =
B
p2
.
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Note that the sign of the approximation error depends sensitively on the
parameters.
Finally, recall from Section 4 that a decent approximation of λ = V ′(L−B)
is readily available for small separable subproblems and, in contrast to the
appropriate budget B, it is independent of the anticipated subproblem prices.
6 Extensions
In practice, some goods are indivisible, and most consumers face liquidity
constraints. We now show how the analysis extends to cover these important
considerations.
6.1 Liquidity constraints
To deal with constraints on transferring purchasing power across time, we need
to augment our model with an additional state variable: the freely available
liquidity. When the consumer wishes to spend more than that, she will have
to bear the cost of borrowing (captured by an interest rate); when she spends
less, she benefits from returns on her saving (again captured by an interest
rate). To focus sharply on the main point, we assume that interest rates are
constant across maturities and quantities borrowed (or saved); extensions to
cover term premiums and quantity premiums are conceptually (if not nota-
tionally) straightforward.
Assume, then, that the consumer has available liquid purchasing power
L0 ∈ [0, L] and earns interest at rate q ≥ −1 on unspent liquid balances, but
pays interest at rate r ≥ max{0, q} on expenditures in excess of L0. Using the
notation [y]
+
= max{0, y}, her continuation purchasing power is
L− e(p · x;L0), where e(p · x;L0) = p · x + r [p · x− L0]+ − q [L0 − p · x]+ .
(23)
Rewriting (6) as V˜ (L,L0) = maxx∈<n
+
[u(x) + V (L− e(p · x;L0))], the first-
order condition becomes
ui(x) = ei(p · x;L0)V ′(L− e(p · x;L0)), i = 1, ..., n, (24)
where
ei(p · x;L0) =
{
pi(1 + q), if L0 > p · x
pi(1 + r), if L0 < p · x. (25)
Approximating V ′(L− e(p · x;L0)) by λ̂ = V ′(L), as before, we have
ui(x) = piλ˜, i = 1, ..., n, (26)
where
λ˜ =
{
λ̂(1 + q), if L0 > p · x
λ̂(1 + r), if L0 < p · x.
(27)
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Figure 1 illustrates the omitted case L0 = p · x, where the marginal value of
money is not defined in (27), but neither is it necessary for the solution as the
optimal expenditure is given by the current liquidity.
The only change relative to the unconstrained case is that λ now is a step
function rather than a constant: the consumer continues to move out on her
IEP until her price-scaled marginal utility drops to λ, which now is increasing
in expenditure (and decreasing in liquidity).
ui/pi (1+r)! 
L0 = px 
utility/$ 
(1+q)! 
!"#!$%&'()!*
Fig. 1 Optimal consumption with liquidity constraint. Expenditure is along the IEP, where
ui
pi
is the same for all goods i = 1, ..., n. In the case shown, optimal expenditure px∗ equals
available liquidity L0.
Note that this set-up is sufficiently general to capture some important
special cases. A “paycheck-to-paycheck” consumer is liquidity constrained in
the sense that she is unable to borrow and she cannot earn interest on any
saving she might have, so q = 0 and r = ∞. In Figure 1, the opportunity
cost of expenditure simply follows the V ′ line until L0, at which point it goes
vertical with no ceiling.13
13 If such a consumer is faced with several purchasing decisions (subproblems) subject to
a unified liquidity constraint, then equation (27) and Figure 1, with q = 0 and r =∞, apply
only to the final decision. For the prior decisions she should still use the unconstrained λ
rule, where the constraint will be built into her continuation (indirect) utility. When the
borrowing constraint binds, the consumer’s time horizon effectively shrinks to a single pay
period. This would decrease the precision of the estimate of λ, leading to a normative and
a positive prediction. First, the final decision should incorporate more goods than usual
to decrease the bias in λ. Second, as the estimate is an underestimate – as V ′(L − px) >
V ′(L) – paycheck-to-paycheck consumers using the moneysworth demand should be bad at
consumption smoothing and get to the end of the month short of money.
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The budget-constrained consumer featured in textbooks is an even more
extreme special case. He is supposed to be unable even to store any of the
subproblem budget, so r =∞ and q = −1. In Figure 1, the bottom step is on
the horizontal axis and the other step is in the sky, so the consumer always
“chooses” to spend exactly her liquid assets.
It may be worth noting that liquidity constraints do not bring back the
textbook income effect. The marginal effect of a change in liquidity continues
to be zero, except when subproblem expenditure is close to available liquidity
L0, and even here the effect is attenuated to the extent that the jump in λ is
finite.
A thought experiment offers some quantitative perspective. Assume that
at the current price (normalized to 1), our consumer is unconstrained but
spends all her liquid wealth on a (composite) good. We now ask the question:
by how much does the price have to decrease, so that she is willing to increase
her expenditure and borrow? In terms of Figure 1, what proportional price
decrease will move u′/p up from the bottom of the step to the top? Inspection
of (27) yields the answer of 1+q1+r ≈ q − r. For a typical consumer the rate
difference between borrowing via credit card or depositing in a savings account
might be about 2% per month. That is, a mere 2% price decrease would
remove her liquidity-constrained inertia. For larger price decreases she would
seem identical to an unconstrained consumer with λ = λ̂(1 + r), and her
moneysworth demand would display no income effect.
6.2 Indivisible goods
Suppose that the consumer faces the small separable subproblem of whether or
not to buy a single indivisible good (or basket of goods) at price p. Indivisibility
is captured in the constraint x ∈ {1, 0}, and we normalize u(0) = 0. Thus the
objective function (9) becomes
max
x∈{1,0}
[u(x)− λxp] = max {0, u(1)− λp} . (28)
Dividing by p, one can say that the consumer calculates the ratio u(1)p of
perceived quality to price and compares it to λ. If the quality-price ratio,
interpreted as value for money, exceeds the marginal utility of money, then
she will buy, and otherwise not buy.14
When the consumer has to choose just one of several mutually exclusive
varieties or baskets, the quality-price ratio no longer suffices. A very small
basket may offer a high value for money, but still provide only a small utility
14 Hauser and Urban (1986) pose as alternative hypotheses that consumers use “value for
money,” u/p, or “net value,” u − λp, to prioritize purchases of indivisibles. Our analysis
shows that the two rankings are equivalent for yes/no decisions, but we shall now show that
“net value” is the appropriate criterion for mutually exclusive alternatives.
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gain.15 Instead, the consumer should rank baskets bk = (xk1 , ..., x
k
n) of indivis-
ibles (so each xki = 0 or 1) at price vector p according to their net utility gain,
gk = u(bk)− λp · bk. Then the consumer picks the basket with highest gk as
long as it is positive, and otherwise picks the null basket b0 = (0, ..., 0) at price
p · b0 = 0 and gain g0 = u(0) − λp · b0 = 0. It follows (after dropping any
basket that is dominated by another basket with lower price and higher util-
ity) that basket k will be preferred to basket j if and only if u(b
k)−u(bj)
p·bk−p·bj ≥ λ.
The gain in utility by choosing k over j must exceed the shadow utility of the
additional expenditure, i.e., the incremental quality-price ratio must exceed
the marginal utility of money.16
By contrast, the budget constrained consumer would pick the highest qual-
ity item that her budget permits. For example, suppose that the consumer has
two baskets available, with u(b1) < u(b2) and p · b1 = B < p · b2 = p · b1+ε.
If and only if
u(b2)− u(b1) < λε (29)
we have 0 < g2 = u(b2) − λp · b2 < u(b1) − λp · b1 = g1, so that both
decision rules lead to the purchase of cheaper basket 1. Condition (29) captures
how the consumer trades off instantaneous utility gain against the shadow
value of money. If the price difference is small enough, she will go for the
more expensive basket (unlike the budget constrained consumer). (29) also
shows how to respond to the appearance of a new variety, or a change in the
valuation of an existing variety. Suppose that the perceived quality difference
between the baskets increases sufficiently, keeping the price difference the same.
This change would not affect the choice according to the budget rule, but it
would again lead to a switch according to the λ rule (and according to lifetime
optimization).
The purchase of a single big ticket item, like an automobile, introduces
two variations. First, to have a better approximation, the value at which the
Taylor expansion is centered should be L minus the representative price of
the cars considered. Second, if the price range under consideration is large
(e.g., both Fiat and Ferrari are in the relevant choice set) then the marginal
utility of money might be higher for more expensive cars. Thus we should set
a different marginal utility of money λi for each different price(range). The
consumer should then choose the variety, qi, which maximizes her net utility
gain u(qi)− λipi.
7 Discussion
The moneysworth approach to consumer choice centers on λ, the marginal
utility of money. Defining λ as the opportunity cost of expenditure in the con-
15 Note that this crucial detail is overlooked in the melioration theory of Herrnstein and
Prelec (1991), which posits that the option with higher utility per $ is the one that is chosen
(in a distributed choice problem).
16 Note that for yes/no decisions the quality-price ratio is also incremental but the bench-
mark is normalized to zero.
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tinuation problem that follows a separable subproblem, we obtain the rule that
expenditure on a good (or on baskets of goods along the appropriate income
expansion path, IEP) should increase until its marginal utility diminishes to
λ.
For small separable subproblems, we obtain moneysworth demand func-
tions xλ that share some features with their standard “Marshallian” counter-
parts xB – notably, both lie on the same subproblem IEP – but xλ has several
distinct advantages.
– It is very simple and specific – the single number λ is a sufficient statistic
for the hugely complex rest-of-life problem. By contrast, each subproblem
requires its own budget B in the standard approach, and short of re-solving
the lifetime problem, it is unclear how B might be determined.
– It is robust to changes in subproblem prices; no change in λ is required
when p changes. By contrast, the appropriate B depends sensitively on p.
– Its elasticities are a first-order approximation of the true (lifetime-optimal)
elasticities. Standard Marshallian elasticities are close to true elasticities
only in the special case that they coincide with xλ’s.
– It is quite intuitive – the consumer tries directly to get her money’s worth.17
Our moneysworth approach offers a fresh perspective on the traditional
distinction between non-pecuniary consumption externalities and pecuniary
externalities. The former recognizes that how much the consumer values a
certain quantity of a good may depend on what else is in her consumption
basket. Often this kind of externality extends only to a small set of goods,
e.g., a few complements and close substitutes, and so can be internalized in a
low-dimensional separable subproblem of the lifetime problem. On the other
hand, pecuniary externalities are pervasive because expenditures are mutually
exclusive: money spent on one good is not available to purchase any other
good. But λ precisely captures this kind of externality.
By contrast, it is hard to specify the appropriate subproblem to which
to apply a budget B in the standard approach. The larger the set of goods,
the better internalized is the pecuniary externality, and the closer one gets to
the true lifetime problem. But at the same time, one loses the tractability of
low-dimensional partial equilibrium analysis.
Standard partial equilibrium analysis routinely conflates the available liq-
uidity L with the expenditure B targeted at a subproblem. Otherwise put,
the natural subproblem boundaries need not coincide with the boundaries of
binding liquidity constraints. Given access to perfectly liquid financial mar-
kets, it is erroneous to specify B other than the lifetime budget constraint.
When there are additional liquidity constraints, they are best dealt with as
in section 6.1, where the textbook analysis is shown to be an extreme and
unrealistic special case.
A key insight from the moneysworth approach is that budgets should not
be applied piecemeal to subproblems, but instead all subproblems should be
17 We suspect that it is also quite descriptive of actual consumer behavior, but we are not
aware of any empirical studies so far that compare the predictive power of xλ and xB .
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solved consistently using a single sufficient statistic, the marginal utility of
money. The point is that funds are fungible, as has long been recognized in
other branches of economics.18
The moneysworth approach is intrinsically cardinal, and thus goes against
textbook orthodoxy favoring ordinal preferences. But that orthodoxy seems in-
creasingly anomalous. After modernization by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) and especially following Friedman and Savage (1948), cardinal prefer-
ences have been routinely assumed in risky choice theory. They are ubiquitous
in applied work (e.g., in industrial organization) and in game theory, and of
course production functions remain cardinal. Why should consumer choice in
the absence of risk be the only topic left that insists on using ordinal prefer-
ences?19
To streamline our presentation, we focused on consumer choice, but similar
reasoning applies to work decisions. For example, a piece rate worker (or con-
sultant) optimally works until the marginal disutility equals the wage times λ.
Likewise the “big ticket” version of the λ rule tells a worker whether to accept
a salaried job, or one with fixed hours. We also streamlined the presentation by
neglecting corner solutions, multiple optima and non-differentiable solutions.
We leave all these generalizations for future research.
One final thought. For several generations, economics instructors have tor-
tured undergraduates with various decompositions of income and substitution
effects, with picky distinctions between gross and net substitutes and comple-
ments, and with ordinal versus cardinal utility. An important benefit of the
moneysworth approach is that it sweeps away such dross, and brings consumer
choice theory closer to common sense.
A Appendix: Connections
Our approach to consumer choice connects numerous topics that economists previously have
considered in isolation. Here are some that have caught our attention.
A.1 Historical perspectives
The idea of a cardinal utility function defined over purchasing power goes back at least
to Bernoulli (1738) and Cramer (1728), but Bentham (1802) was apparently the first to
18 In public finance, for example, it is well known that a uniform income tax is more efficient
for raising a given amount of revenue than a collection of specific taxes on individual items.
19 Arguably, revealed preference theory is the real contribution of ordinality. A companion
paper (Sa´kovics 2013) shows that revealed preference theory has a cardinal counterpart, with
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference replaced by the stronger Axiom of Revealed
Valuation (ARV). Formally, assume that we have T observations of a consumer’s chosen
bundles, xt ∈ <n+, at price vectors, pt ∈ <n++. Let atj = pt · (xj − xt) denote the pecuniary
advantage of the chosen bundle xt relative to an arbitrary bundle xj . Then ARV states:
For every ordered subset {i, j, k, ..., s} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., T}, aij + ajk + ...+ asi ≥ 0. The main
theorem states: If and only if the observed choices satisfy ARV, they are rationalizable by
a cardinal utility function of the form u(x)− λp · x.
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develop the idea to explain choice in the absence of risk. These economists, and their suc-
cessors, presumed that the utility function was concave, if only because the more attractive
consumption opportunities would be selected first.
Marshall’s (1890, 1920) theory of consumer demand centered on λ. In the special case
that utility is additively separable in each good, he obtained the crucial first order condition
that marginal utility for each good equals its price times the marginal utility of money. Given
the market price pi for some good i (tea was Marshall’s favorite example), the consumer
increases or decreases his consumption xi until the marginal utility it brings is equal to the
market price scaled by λ, the marginal utility of money, assumed exogenous and constant.
“Edgeworth destroyed this pleasant simplicity and specificity when he wrote the total
utility function as f(x1, x2, x3, ...),” says Stigler (1950, p. 322). It fell to Hicks and Allen
(1934) to show how to impose a budget set to derive demand functions and cross-price
elasticities when goods might have complements and substitutes. Their analysis, developed
further by Paul Samuelson and a host of other economists, ultimately became textbook
orthodoxy.
Biswas (1977) eventually showed that Marshall’s approach could be extended to inter-
dependent goods without the imposition of a budget constraint. He noted that the marginal
utility of money is constant only in the short run and thus its adjustment is of relevance.
Biswas’ purpose was to explain Marshall’s approach, so he did not develop a full-fledged
alternative theory of the consumer; e.g., as far as we know he did not show the relation
to the IEP or explore the basis of the constant λ assumption. He was content to establish
the existence of a downward-sloping demand function satisfying Marshall’s first-order con-
ditions, and labored to salvage Giffen goods by writing out an adjustment process for λ
based on the – what seems to us peculiar – assumption that the consumer observes the ex
post optimal expenditure (E∗) while she adjust her λ only partially.
A.2 Macro connections
Frisch (1932, 1959) was among the first economists to pose a representative agent’s intertem-
poral consumption problem as maximizing the discounted sum of a fixed concave felicity
(i.e., subutility) function v for composite consumption c each period t, subject only to a
lifetime budget constraint. Of course, relative to the general equilibrium problem posed in
Section 2, Frisch’s problem is a special case in which the continuation is an evenly spaced
sequence of subproblems identical to the current subproblem, and separation is built in. As-
suming that the agent’s personal discount rate is equal to the interest rate in a frictionless
financial market, the first order (i.e., Euler) condition for this optimization problem states
that marginal felicity v′(ct) is constant across periods and equal to the Lagrange multiplier
on the budget constraint (e.g., Deaton 1992, Chapter 1, equations 5-9).20 Here λ is not a
simple approximation, but rather is the exact GE opportunity cost of expenditure, albeit in
a highly stylized model.
Macroeconomists exploring consumption smoothing and the permanent income hypoth-
esis adapted and extended Frisch’s approach.21 The papers in this tradition that come closest
to our own work were written in the 1980s by Deaton, Browning, and various coauthors.
Browning (1985, 2005) re-expresses the Euler equation in terms of the marginal utility of
expenditure, and obtains what we would call a moneysworth demand function. Referring to
this function as Frisch demand, he argues that it is more relevant to fiscal policy analysis
than the usual constant-budget (“Marshallian”) or constant-utility (“Hicksian”) demand
20 Allen (1933) interpreted Frisch’s constant λ as an unjustified imposition of additional
restrictions on the utility function. Eventually, Brown and Calsamiglia (2003) noted that
Frisch demand functions are better understood as related to Marshall’s theory of consumer
demand.
21 Heckman (1974) was apparently the first to use λ-constant comparative statics in such
models. Bewley (1977) proposed a consumer theory for the life-time problem using the
constancy of marginal utility of money. See Bewley (2007, Chapter 8.3) for a recent synthesis.
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functions, and shows how it can be estimated from aggregate data despite the unobserv-
ability of λ. Browning et al. (1985) consider the somewhat more abstract problem where
consumption is additively separable in all goods (or at least “block additive,” i.e., that it
consists of a finite number of separable subproblems) and is subject to a single overall bud-
get constraint. They construct the consumer “profit function,” a renormalized version of our
objective function (9), and use variants on textbook duality identities to obtain properties
of the corresponding Frisch demand function. The main properties, some of which help to
identify econometric specifications, are (a) degree 0 homogeneity in p and r = 1/λ (which
also is transparent from our equation (10) or even from (9)); (b) symmetry of cross partials
(as noted after our Prop 1); (c) substitution matrix is proportional to H−1 (as can also
be seen from Prop 1); and (d) downward sloping demand (again noted after Prop 1). The
article also gives formulas for moving among Marshallian, Hicksian and Frisch demand.
The concerns of this strand of literature – consumption smoothing and estimating elas-
ticities from aggregate national consumption data – are quite different from ours, and con-
sequently so are the contributions. This literature does not consider the quality of approxi-
mations to GE demand as in our Proposition 3 (they do not need to approximate in their
stylized GE model), nor investigate how λ might be determined and adjusted at the dis-
aggregated individual level, nor discuss separability and the microfoundations of individual
consumer behavior.
A.3 Behavioral connections
Miscalibration. Some consumers may have a persistently biased view of their true marginal
utility for money. A miser is someone who (perhaps because of an impoverished childhood
and stalled adjustment) maintains an unreasonably high λ, relative to typical preferences
and to his actual lifetime opportunities. Likewise, a spendthrift maintains an unreasonably
low λ. Thus, if λ is badly calibrated, the moneysworth approach will describe some prominent
forms of suboptimal behavior.
Money illusion. Lifetime utility U(X) depends only on actual consumption, and not
directly on nominal quantities such as L and P ; recall that the indirect utility function is
homogeneous of degree 0 in (L,P ). Hence a proportional change in all prices (and income)
will have no effect on the consumption plans or utility of Homo Economicus. The same is
true in the textbook treatment of a subproblem with the budget B adjusted in the same
proportion as the price vector.
However, inflation in the real world is much messier than a simultaneous proportional
price change. An important empirical regularity is that relative prices become more volatile
as the measured rate of inflation rises (see, for example, Heymann and Leijonhufvud 1995).
Actual people updating λ, therefore, are unlikely to immediately adjust to a change in the
price level. According to (16) they will lag in reacting to observed nominal increases in
prices of purchased goods (and, by extension, overreact to nominal increases in wages; see,
for example, Genesove and Mayer 2001). That is, in the parlance of macroeconomic theory,
they will suffer from money illusion.
If prices settle down, an adaptive moneysworth consumer will, after some lag, find a
new λ appropriate to the new price level. The illusion eventually fades, as it should.
System 1 vs 2. Our consumer has two operational phases: normally she just goes
around with her λ and makes quasi-automatic decisions, while occasionally she updates
her λ, using a more thoughtful procedure. This dual process fits well with the two-system
approach originated by Stanovich and West (2000), surveyed by Evans and Frankish (2009),
and popularized by Kahneman (2011). System 1 works like a reflex and has no significant
cost to operate (a bit like the body’s vegetative system), while System 2 ponders decisions
but requires time and attention, which are in limited supply. There are certain cues in the
environment which give the control over to System 2, otherwise the default decision maker
is System 1. Our model goes beyond this switching scheme by introducing an element of
communication between the systems: λ.
By tracking neural responses to the observation of the price of an item, Knutson et al.
(2007) show that the price of an item generates a significant cue about whether the item
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will be purchased. This implies that the decision to buy is mostly based on the price (and
the utility value) of the good, fitting well with moneysworth demand, and its System 1
interpretation.
Mental accounting. Read et al. (1999) and Thaler (1999) launched a sizeable empirical
literature called narrow bracketing or mental accounting. In our terminology, the idea is that
consumers sometimes treat non-separable subproblems as if they were separable, resulting
in inefficient choices. For example, a consumer may regard the health risk as negligible
when considering smoking a single cigarette. The addictive properties of nicotine warrant a
broader definition of the subproblem, and the consumer might come to a different conclusion
when considering smoking a pack a day for a year, or for a decade.
We see the moneysworth approach as sharpening the empirical questions to be investi-
gated. First, when are humans more likely to treat non-separable consumption problems as
separable? Second, when faced with a subproblem, separable or otherwise, when do humans
use a fixed budget to make their choice, and when do they use the marginal utility of money?
The empirical literature has made progress on the first question, especially in highlight-
ing self-control issues. For example, a liquidity-constrained gambler may bring exactly $2500
to Las Vegas in an attempt to ensure that he can pay the rent next month. (The ubiquitous
presence of cash machines in casinos suggests that this self-control device is less than 100%
successful!) We believe that the question can be asked more broadly; perhaps there are cog-
nitive issues as well as self-control issues in defining separable subproblems. The answer to
this empirical question is at least as important to our moneysworth approach as it is to the
standard approach.
In our reading of the mental accounting literature, the second question has seldom
been asked, even though to us it seems pivotal. The question seems amenable to laboratory
investigation, especially since payments received in the lab are normally quite separate from
the rest of the subject’s life. One could set up various moderately complicated lab tasks, and
in one treatment frame the tasks in terms of budgets and in another treatment frame them
in terms of the marginal utility of money. Then one could check which treatment encouraged
more efficient choices. A more direct test is simply to provide access to budgeting tools as
well as λ-oriented tools, and to see which the subjects prefer to use.
Other biases. Many sorts of behavioral biases can be captured by assigning plausible
but non-optimal values to λ. Non-standard time preferences illustrate the procedure. An
agent wishing to pay debt early and delay payment for work done as in Prelec and Loewen-
stein (1998) can be accommodated by positing a higher λ for consumption and a lower one
for work income.
Considering our model as the rational benchmark, it can “suffer” from yet other behav-
ioral biases. For example, as in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010)22, the consumer may engage in
“local thinking” by not following through with a full-blown updating of λ, rather recalling
the small subset of situations that first come to her mind.
Appendix B: Mathematical Details
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that all three setups share the n − 1 equations defining the
IEP:
piuk = pkui for k 6= i. (30)
The nth equations are23
ui(x) = piV
′(L− p · x), ui(x) = piλ, and p · x = B, (31)
22 See also Bordalo et al. 2013, for a related model based on the salience of past observa-
tions.
23 We have chosen the ith coordinates as we will be checking sensitivity to the ith price.
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for the global, the λ and the budget solutions, respectively. Differentiation of the common
equations with respect to pi yields
uk + pi
∑
m
ukm
∂xm
∂pi
= pk
∑
m
uim
∂xm
∂pi
, (32)
which simplifies to ∑
m
(pkuim − piukm)
∂xm
∂pi
= uk. (33)
Differentiating the other three equations, we have∑
m
uim
∂xm
∂pi
= V ′(L− p · x)− pi
(
xi +
∑
m
pm
∂xm
∂pi
)
V ′′(L− p · x), (34)
∑
m
uim
∂xm
∂pi
= λ, (35)
and
xi +
∑
m
pm
∂xm
∂pi
= 0. (36)
If V ′′(L − B) = 0, then it is immediate that the price sensitivities of the lambda rule
will coincide with the optimal ones at p = p̂, while the budget rule would only be a good
approximation by coincidence. Otherwise, denoting the ith row of the Hessian of u(x∗(p̂))
by Hi, we obtain the following three equation systems:

p̂1Hi − p̂iH1
p̂2Hi − p̂iH2
...
Hi + p̂p̂iV
′′
...
p̂nHi − p̂iHn


∂x∗1
∂pi
∂x∗2
∂pi
...
∂x∗i
∂pi
.
..
∂x∗n
∂pi

=

u1
u2
...
V ′ − x∗i p̂iV ′′
...
un
 (37)

p̂1Hi − p̂iH1
p̂2Hi − p̂iH2
...
Hi
.
..
p̂nHi − p̂iHn


∂xλ1
∂pi
∂xλ2
∂pi
...
∂xλi
∂pi
...
∂xλn
∂pi

=

u1
u2
...
λ
...
un
 (38)

p̂1Hi − p̂iH1
p̂2Hi − p̂iH2
...
p̂
..
.
p̂nHi − p̂iHn


∂xB1
∂pi
∂xB2
∂pi
...
∂xBi
∂pi
...
∂xBn
∂pi

=

u1
u2
...
−xBi
..
.
un
 (39)
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Denoting the matrices by G,L and D, respectively, we can apply Cramer’s rule to solve
the systems of equations:
∂x∗j
∂pi
=
∣∣Gj∣∣
|G| ,
∂xλj
∂pi
=
∣∣Lj∣∣
|L| , and
∂xBj
∂pi
=
∣∣Dj∣∣
|D| , (40)
where a superindexed matrix means that its jth column is replaced by the vector on the
right-hand side of its corresponding system. Since when the realized prices equal the expected
ones V ′(L− p · x) = λ and x∗i = xBi it is immediate that
|G| = |L|+ |D| p̂iV ′′ and
∣∣Gj∣∣ = ∣∣Lj∣∣+ ∣∣Dj∣∣ p̂iV ′′. (41)
By subtracting multiples of row i in L it is easy to see that |L| = (−p̂i)n−1 |H| . By the
same method – using the fact that uk = pkλ for all k – we can ensure that the j
th column
of
∣∣Lj∣∣ has zeros everywhere except in the ith place where it has λ. Writing out the Laplace
expansion it is immediate that
∣∣Lj∣∣ = (−1)i+jλ(−p̂i)n−1 |Hij |. Finally, let aj = ∣∣Dj∣∣ and
b = |D| . Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2:
∣∣∣∣ |Lj |+aj p̂iV ′′(−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′ − |Lj |(−p̂i)n−1|H|
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ −(aj(−p̂i)n|H|+|Lj |bp̂i)V ′′((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|
∣∣∣∣ =
−
∣∣aj(−p̂i)n|H|+|Lj |bp̂i∣∣V ′′∣∣((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|∣∣ , that is clearly equal to zero when V ′′ = 0. To see that
the convergence is monotone, note that aj and b are independent of V
′′ :
d V
′′∣∣((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|∣∣
dV ′′
=

∣∣((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|∣∣−V ′′∣∣bp̂i(−p̂i)n−1|H|∣∣∣∣((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|∣∣2∣∣((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|∣∣+V ′′∣∣bp̂i(−p̂i)n−1|H|∣∣∣∣((−p̂i)n−1|H|+bp̂iV ′′)(−p̂i)n−1|H|∣∣2
,
(42)
where we obtain the upper line if the denominator on the left-hand side is increasing in V ′′
and the bottom line otherwise. As V ′′ < 0, the upper line is clearly positive. The bottom
line as well, as the denominator is decreasing in V ′′ implying that bp̂iV ′′(−p̂i)n−1 |H| > 0,
while
(
(−p̂i)n−1 |H|
)2
> 0 as well. Q.E.D.
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